On the neurophysiology of consciousness: Part II. Constraining the semantic problem.
J E Bogen
Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1020 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Thalamic nuclei Nerve net Neural pathways Animals Humans Brain mapping Awareness Consciousness Species specificity Semantics |
| Key points | Argues that subjective awareness, termed "C", depends on the intralaminar nuclei of each thalamus, and that the internal structure and external relations of these nuclei make subjective awareness possible. This essay focuses on semantic and philosophical background for propositions 0, 1, and 2 from Part I. |
Abstract
The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness (more precisely, what I call C) depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalamus (hereafter, ILN). This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I (Bogen, 1995). This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II should be read in conjunction with Part I.
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