Only what exists can cause: An intrinsic powers view of free will
Giulio Tononi, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Chiara Cirelli, Matteo Grasso, Christof Koch
arXiv Preprint Archive June 4, 2022 preprint
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc |
| Key points | Argues that integrated information theory implies genuine free will, because consciousness as intrinsic existence entails that individuals—not their neurons or atoms—are the cause of their willed actions and bear responsibility for them. |
Abstract
This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and of how its presence and quality can be accounted for in physical terms. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain. Moreover, the way an experience feels is accounted for by how that cause-effect power is structured. If IIT is right, we do have free will in a genuine sense: we have alternatives, reasons, and values, we make decisions, and we-not our neurons or atoms-are the cause of our willed actions and bear responsibility for them. IIT's argument for genuine free will hinges on the proper understanding of consciousness as intrinsic existence, captured by its intrinsic powers ontology: what exists absolutely, in physical terms, are intrinsic entities, and only what exists can cause.