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Only what exists can cause: An intrinsic view of free will

Giulio Tononi, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Chiara Cirelli, Christof Koch

arXiv Preprint Archive June 4, 2022 via arXiv

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Integrated information theory (IIT) implies that free will exists in a fundamental sense. IIT defines consciousness as a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain, with the structure of that power determining how experiences feel. According to this theory, humans have true alternatives, make true decisions, and are the true cause of their willed actions, bearing true responsibility. The argument depends on an intrinsic powers ontology: only intrinsic entities truly exist and can cause effects, and consciousness qualifies as such an entity.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Q-bio.nc
Key finding Argues that integrated information theory implies humans have true free will, including true alternatives and true responsibility for actions.

Abstract

This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and what it takes to have it. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain. Moreover, the way specific experiences feel is accounted for by how that cause-effect power is structured. If IIT is right, we do have free will in the fundamental sense: we have true alternatives, we make true decisions, and we - not our neurons or atoms - are the true cause of our willed actions and bear true responsibility for them. IIT's argument for true free will hinges on the proper understanding of consciousness as true existence, as captured by its intrinsic powers ontology: what truly exists, in physical terms, are intrinsic entities, and only what truly exists can cause.

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