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A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism

Marcus Arvan

preprint DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1636024 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative
Key points Argues that qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally intrinsic and not fully describable in language, unlike relational properties, thereby supporting mind-body dualism.

Abstract

This paper provides an elegant proof of mind-body dualism. I show, first, that all properties known to humankind, aside from qualitative properties of consciousness (and perhaps numerical properties), are fundamentally relational in nature. I then show that relational properties are, at least in principle, always fully describable in language. Finally, I point out that qualitative properties of consciousness are clearly not fully describable in ordinary language. Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind: they are fundamentally intrinsic properties that stand outside of the realm of scientific inquiry.