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Is the Near-Death Experience Only N-Methyl-D-Aspartate Blocking?

P. Fenwick

Journal of Near-Death Studies March 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1023/a:1025059210388 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Near-death experience
Key points Argues that Jansen's NMDA receptor blockade hypothesis for NDEs is limited, as it fails to account for NDEs without physiological crisis, and that the clarity and memory of NDEs contradict compromised brain function. Proposes that NDEs may indicate consciousness can continue after brain death.

Abstract

Karl Jansen's interesting hypothesis that near-death experiences (NDEs) result from blockade of the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor has several weaknesses. Some NDEs occur to individuals who are neither near death nor experiencing any event likely to upset cerebral physiology as Jansen proposed; thus his hypothesis applies only to a subset of NDEs that occur in catastrophic circumstances. For that subset, the clarity of NDEs and the clear memory for the experience afterward are inconsistent with compromised cerebral function. Jansen's analogy between NDEs and ketamine-induced hallucinations is weakened by the fact that most ketamine users do not believe the events they perceived really happened. Temporal lobe seizures do not resemble NDEs as Jansen postulated; they are confusional, rarely ecstatic, and never clear, as are NDEs, nor are they remembered afterward. Jansen's hypothesis assumes the standard scientific view that brain processes are entirely responsible for subjective experience; however, NDEs suggest that that concept of the mind may be too limited, and that in fact personal experience may continue beyond death of the brain.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on near-death experience, most cited first.

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