Hacia una fenomenología negativa de los sueños

Abstract

In the first part of the essay, I describe phenomenologically the transition between dreaming and wakefulness in order to determine whether a reliable dream memory can result from this transition (after all, we have no evidence of our dreams other than our memories). This description shows that this is indeed the case and indicates the conditions under which we can apprehend dreams without imposing on them meanings they do not have. These conditions, or “attitude” is theoretically supported by a negative phenomenology of dreams, namely, a phenomenology which describes dreams by stating what they are not. This first part also explains why we usually forget our dreams and accounts for the cases in which we are conscious of dreaming. In the second part I sketch out a negative phenomenology. This phenomenology shows that the attributions consisting in qualifying dreams, or assigning them hidden originary meanings in need of deciphering (or interpreting), or their own teleology, as well as certain positive attributions (i.e. those that start by affirming: “dreams are such and such”) are nonsensical. The conclusions demonstrate the continuity between the “threshold or transitional phenomenology” developed in the first part, and the negative phenomenology developed in the second.