Consciousness in Human and Machine: A Theory and Some Falsifiable Predictions
June 10, 2009 DOI: 10.2991/agi.2009.14 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is real but ineffable, and that any cognitive system of sufficient power will inevitably face the hard problem. Proposes a meta-level explanation that allows consciousness to be both explicable and mysterious, and concludes that future thinking machines will have subjective consciousness like ours. |
Abstract
To solve the hard problem of consciousness we first note that all cognitive systems of sufficient power must get into difficulty when trying to analyze consciousness concepts, because the mechanism that does the analysis will bottom out in such a way that the system declares these concepts to be both real and ineffable. Rather than use this observation to dismiss consciousness as an artifact, we propose a unifying interpretation that allows consciousness to be regarded as explicable at a meta level, while at the same time being mysterious and inexplicable on its own terms. It is further suggested that science must concede that there are some aspects of the world that deserve to be called ‘real’, but which are beyond explanation. The main conclusion is that thinking machines of the future will, inevitably, have just the same subjective consciousness that we do. Some testable predictions can be derived from this theory.