Consciousness, Computation, and the Chinese Room
Views into the Chinese Room August 22, 2002 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198250579.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that computational simulation cannot by itself evoke awareness and that the brain's physical action producing awareness may not be properly simulated computationally, challenging purely computational accounts of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract I shall begin by recalling what I perceive to be the four polarities of viewpoint that I enunciated in Shadows of the Mind (Penrose 1994: 12) with regard to the relationship between conscious thought and computation: All thinking is computation; in particular, feelings of conscious aware ness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate computations. Awareness is a feature of the brain’s physical action; and whereas any physical action can be simulated computationally, computational simulation cannot by itself evoke awareness. Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally. Awareness cannot be explained in physical, computational, or any other scientific terms.