Aksioloska funkcija qualia
Iva Draskic-Vicanovic
Theoria, Beograd 2009 DOI: 10.2298/theo0904089d (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Hume's attempt to surmount the explanatory gap through his analysis of reason's functions was unsuccessful, and proposes that qualia of the affective segment of mind are treated as constituents of moral and aesthetic values and as causes of actions in the physical world. |
Abstract
This article presents an analysis of David Hume's epistemological position faced with explanatory gap problem. What did Hume do? Did he resolve the explanatory gap problem or made it insurmountable? The text falls into two main parts: In the first the author tries to show that Hume's attempt to surmount explanatory gap by his analysis of reason's functions was completely unsuccessful. In the second author outlines an extremely interesting role of so called qualia in Hume's gnoseology, defining it as axiological. Namely qualia of affective segment of mind are treated as constituents of moral and aesthetic values and also as causes of actions in physical world.