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Consciousness in hypnosis

John F. Kihlstrom

Cambridge University Press eBooks May 14, 2007 DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511816789.018 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

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Characteristics Review Peer reviewed
Citations 26
Key findings Argues that computational modeling of consciousness generally assumes the sufficiency and necessity of mechanistic explanations, and that existing models can be compared and contrasted based on psychological and philosophical evidence, with representative models exemplifying either two-system or one-system views.

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of existing computational (mechanistic) models of cognition in relation to the study of consciousness, on the basis of psychological and philosophical theories and data. It begins by examining some foundational issues concerning computational approaches toward consciousness. Then, various existing models and their explanations of the conscious/unconscious distinction are presented. Work in the area of computational modeling of consciousness generally assumes the sufficiency and the necessity of mechanistic explanations. The chapter looks into some details of two representative computational models, exemplifying either two systems or one-system views. Various related issues, such as the utility of computational models, explanations of psychological data, and potential applications of machine consciousness, have been touched on in the process. Based on existing psychological and philosophical evidence, existing models were compared and contrasted to some extent.