What Would It “Be Like” to Solve the “Hard Problem.” Cognition, Consciousness, and Qualia-Zombies
Greg P. Hodes
NeuroQuantology September 5, 2007 DOI: 10.14704/nq.2005.3.1.58 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that Chalmers' focus on qualia consciousness is inadequate, and that higher-order cognitional events, whose consciousness is distinct from qualia, are essential to solving the hard problem. |
Abstract
David Chalmers argues that consciousness -authentic, first-person, conscious consciousness -cannot be reduced to brain events or to any physical event, and that efforts to find a workable mind-body identity theory are, therefore, doomed in principle. But for Chalmers and non-reductionist in general consciousness consists exclusively, or at least paradigmatically, of phenomenal or qualia-consciousness. This results in a seriously inadequate understanding both of consciousness and of the "hard problem. I describe other, higher-order cognitional events which must be conscious if the "hard problem is to be solved --in any sense of solve which would make us any the wiser about it --but whose consciousness is quite different from the qualia and phenomena usually inventoried. Events of this kind are both part of the hard problem and the means by which we will solve it, if we ever do.
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