Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?
Chuck Stieg
December 25, 2009 DOI: 10.1007/bf03379558 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Nichols and Grantham's complexity-based case for consciousness as an adaptation fails to show that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system, and suggests that rejecting the access/phenomenal consciousness distinction may better serve the adaptationist goal. |
Abstract
Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.