Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness
Philosophy of Science December 1, 2000 DOI: 10.1086/392859 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that complexity arguments can circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in debates about phenomenal consciousness. Proposes that evidence from cognitive neuropsychology indicates phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex, providing prima facie evidence that it is an adaptation, and that this complexity may also illuminate its causal role. |
Abstract
Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.