Saving the particulars: religious experience and religious ends
Religious Studies December 1, 2000 DOI: 10.1017/s0034412500005382 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the evidential value of religious experience can be preserved despite conflicting testimonies by adopting two assumptions: multiple religious ends and intrinsic complexity in the religious object, which may also serve as theological criteria. |
Abstract
Conflict in the testimony of religious experiences appears to seriously undercut its evidential value. Arguments that make positive appeal to the evidence of religious experience usually deal with this objection by denying evidential value to the particularistic elements in such experience as descriptive of an ultimate religious reality and an ultimate human end. Using the work of Jerome Gellman, I contend that the referential value of diverse and particular religious testimony can be saved. I suggest that the strongest form of this argument requires two assumptions: the possibility of multiple religious ends and intrinsic complexity in the religious object. If the argument is valid, these assumptions may also serve as theological criteria.