Thomas Reid on Consciousness and Attention
Canadian Journal of Philosophy June 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1353/cjp.0.0044 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that early modern philosophers, including Locke, equated a mental entity's being in the mind with the mind's consciousness of it, treating consciousness as a relation akin to inherence. |
Abstract
It was common enough in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to find philosophers holding the position that for something to be ‘in the mind’ and for that mind to be conscious of it are one and the same thing. The thought is that consciousness is a relation between a mind and a mental entity playing the same role as the relation of inherence found between a substance and qualities belonging to it. What it is, on this view, for something to ‘inhere’ in the mind is for that mind to be conscious of it. Locke was explicit in his acceptance of such a claim, writing, for instance,[T]o be in the Mind, and, never to be perceived, is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind.