IV-Agency and Embodied Cognition
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society April 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00299.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 17 |
| Key points | Argues that two considerations advanced in favor of embodied cognition are in tension with the dominant intentionalist account of agency and support Merleau-Ponty's view that action does not require intentions, but arises from the agent's apprehension of her environment. |
Abstract
The dominant account of agency takes actions to be brought about and guided by intentions that represent the agent's performance of the action. Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative view that denies intentions are essential for action. He holds instead that the agent's activity is brought about by her apprehension of her environment, without the need for any intervening thoughts that represent her performance of it. I argue that two considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that human cognition is embodied are in tension with the dominant account of agency, and speak in favour of Merleau-Ponty's view.