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In Defence of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation

Michael Silberstein

Oxford University Press eBooks May 15, 2008 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199544318.003.0009 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 38
Key points Argues that ontological emergence, when combined with enactivism, is philosophically sound and may offer scientific explanations, while casting doubt on physicalist doctrines that reject such emergence.

Abstract

The first section characterises the kind of emergence defended in this chapter and situates it largely in the enactive paradigm of consciousness and cognition. The second section begins to cast doubt on physicalism and related doctrines in philosophy of mind that speak against ontological emergence. In the process, it becomes clear that ontological emergence cum enactivism is philosophically sound and potentially scientifically explanatory.

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