Dreams, Scepticism and Idealism
Theoria August 11, 2026 DOI: 10.1111/theo.70105 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the narrative linking Berkeleyan idealism to Cartesian dream skepticism originated with Andrew Baxter, whose self-defeating criticism anticipates contemporary analyses, but that Berkeley himself dismissed dream skepticism. Proposes that Berkeley's perceptual relativity arguments, not dream skepticism, may explain the narrative's persistence. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT On one narrative, Berkeleyan idealism arises from Cartesian theorising: Descartes's discussion of dreaming in the Meditations leads first to scepticism, and through scepticism, to Berkeley's rejection of realism. In this paper, I consider how this move from dreams to idealism is supposed to work. I trace this narrative back to Andrew Baxter, one of Berkeley's earliest critics, and reconstruct Baxter's argument that idealism is self‐defeating, a criticism that anticipates some contemporary commentators' analyses. I then turn to Berkeley's text to show that Berkeley's own attitude towards dream scepticism is dismissive at best. This raises the question of how the narrative connecting dreams to idealism took hold; I argue that one place to look may be to Berkeley's perceptual relativity arguments. I suggest that understanding Baxter's criticism helps illuminate both how we should read those arguments, and also, more generally, how we should understand idealism's relationship to scepticism and dreaming.