Are We Such Stuff as Dreams Are Made On? Narrative and the Oneiric Imagination
Eidos A Journal for Philosophy of Culture August 15, 2026 DOI: 10.14394/eidos.jpc.2026.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that dreams are neither narrative nor purely episodic but a non-narrative storied phenomenon, a wordless récit without plot or author, experienced in pre-reflective consciousness; upon waking, narrative configuration occurs but a fissure remains between the dreaming self and the remembering self. |
Abstract
This essay examines dreaming as a challenge to the dichotomy between narrative and episodic conceptions of the self.Drawing on Sartre's phenomenology of the imaginary, it argues that dreams elude both accounts: dream consciousness is episodic and pre-reflective -reflective awareness that one is dreaming would annihilate the dream -yet dreams are experienced, on Sartre's insight, as "a story that I am reading or being told."Refining this claim through Genette's distinction between récit and histoire, the essay proposes that a dream is a non-narrative storied phenomenon: a wordless récit without plot, author, or narrative distance, experienced in the "pure belief" of a consciousness closed upon itself.Upon waking, the dream solicits narrative configuration, though a fissure persists between the dreaming "me" and the remembering "I." Literary works by Proust, Queneau, Schnitzler, and Han Kang illustrate this entanglement of dreaming, storytelling, and selfhood.