Mutual Recognition in the Philosophy of Physics: QBism, Phenomenology, Hegel
George Webster
August 18, 2026
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that QBism's response to Wigner's friend paradox reveals an implicit commitment to a mutually recognitive conception of agency, grounded in acknowledgment between agents. Proposes that Merleau-Ponty's intersubjectivity and Hegel's mutual recognition provide a philosophical foundation for this conception, offering novel resources for QBism's ontology. |
Abstract
Recent discussions of QBism have turned increasingly toward the question of its ontology. I argue that key insights into QBism's ontology of agency can be identified by reconstructing its response to Wigner's friend paradox. I clarify the relation between two formulations of that response: one grounded in the claim that quantum states are agents'personal probability assignments, and another grounded in the injunction to treat all users of quantum theory as agents on equal footing. Once disambiguated, these formulations reveal an implicit commitment to a mutually recognitive conception of agency, according to which the agential status of a user of quantum theory depends constitutively on the acknowledgement of other agents. This analysis clarifies what is at stake in recent QBist engagements with phenomenology - namely, the search for a more philosophically robust account of this conception of agency. I show how Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity underpins the recognitive structure implicated in QBism before tracing these themes to Hegel's account of mutual recognition. By locating QBism within a longstanding tradition of mutual recognition, I claim that we not only illuminate its theoretical structure but also open up novel conceptual resources for the rigorous articulation and justification of its ontology.
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