The Explanatory Gap: A Narrative Review of the Mind-Body Problem from Descartes' Dualism to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) August 30, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22177024 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Narrative review |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key findings | Argues that the mind-body problem's structure is stable, opposing physicalism's causal completeness with consciousness's appearances, and that its resolution will come from empirical work in neuroscience of report and the science of informational integration. |
Abstract
The mind-body problem asks how mental phenomena---experience, intention, subjectivity---relate to physical processes, and its modern history runs from Descartes' dualism through identity theory's physicalism to the hard problem's contemporary revival. This article presents a narrative review of the debate's canonical line: Descartes' 1641 Meditations, Ryle's 1949 ghost-in-the-machine critique, Place's 1956 and Smart's 1959 identity theory, Nagel's 1974 bat, Jackson's 1982 knowledge argument, Levine's 1983 explanatory gap, Dennett's 1991 heterophenomenology, Chalmers' 1995 hard problem and 1996 naturalistic dualism, Kim's 1998 physicalist crisis, Papineau's 2002 physicalist disidentification, and the contemporary neuroscience-informed landscape. The synthesis is organized around three themes: the physicalist program, in which mind was identified with brain---type identity, functionalism, and eliminativism competing as readings; the qualia resistance, in which what-it-is-likeness, knowledge arguments, and the gap pressed physicalism's explanatory reach; and the dialectical settlement, in which the hard problem's status---genuine or confected---became the field's organizing dispute. It is concluded that the problem's structure is stable: physicalism's causal completeness against consciousness's appearances---and that its future is empirical, through neuroscience of report and the science of informational integration.
Comparable studies
Other narrative reviews on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics | 2008 | Review article | |
| Phenomenology, Structure, and Dynamic of Psychedelic States | 2016 | Review | |
| Classic Hallucinogens and Mystical Experiences: Phenomenology and Neural Correlates. | 2018 | Review | |
| The lived experience of psychosis: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics. Individuals with lived experience of psychosis, family members, and carers | 2022 | Co-written bottom-up review | |
| From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela's exploration of the biophysics of being. | 2003 | Review |