Inferring Affective Consciousness in an Artificial Agent: A Case Study
Mark Solms, St John Grimbly, Bruce Bassett, Evert A. Boonstra, Rowan Hodson, Nicolas Kuske, Kival Mahadew, Benjamin Rosman, Charel van Hoof, Jonathan Shock
Journal of Consciousness Studies August 1, 2026 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.33.7.014 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Case report Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that a deterministic artificial agent can exhibit hedonic place preference behavior by instantiating felt uncertainty about intrinsic needs, suggesting that such behavior does not necessarily indicate subjective feelings and raising questions about the physical basis of consciousness and free will. |
Abstract
Creatures that display ‘hedonic place preference behaviour’ are thought by many scientists to experience feelings, on the assumption that their attraction to pleasure-producing substances which lack nutritional value (e.g. cocaine, morphine) cannot easily be attributed to unconscious instinctual behaviour. In this paper, we discuss how a simple artificial agent that instantiates attributes of an affective system engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs in relation to environmental resources can similarly display hedonic place preference behaviour — through an apparently subjective form of information processing — while simultaneously being entirely deterministic. We outline some implications of this artificially engineered behaviour for our understanding of the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.