The Holographic Dream Consciousness as Symbolic Appearance in a Self-contained Memory System A Multidisciplinary Investigation into the Nature of Self, Reality, and the Construction of Experience
Mulat Tazebew
SSRN Electronic Journal 2026 preprint DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.7147200 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Dream The symbolic Identity music Proposition Cognition Multidisciplinary approach Feature linguistics Cognitive science Cognitive psychology Epistemology Interpretation philosophy Interface matter Dualism |
| Key points | Argues that the self and conscious experience are symbolic constructions generated by the brain, supported by evidence from cognitive neuroscience and theoretical frameworks. Proposes that recognizing the holographic nature of experience does not eliminate the appearance of reality but transforms one's relationship to it, enabling a lighter, more compassionate engagement with the dream without a dreamer. |
Abstract
This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the nature of consciousness, selfhood, and perceived reality through the lens of the holographic hypothesis-the proposition that all phenomena consist of symbolic information within a self-contained memory system with no external referent. The inquiry begins with an examination of the "self" as a symbolic construction generated by the brain, supported by evidence from cognitive neuroscience, split-brain studies, body-ownership illusions, and predictive processing theories. It demonstrates that the sense of a unified, continuous self is not a fundamental feature of reality but a holographic appearance-vivid, dimensional, and present, yet empty of substantial existence when examined closely. The paper extends this analysis to the entire structure of conscious experience, arguing that time, place, and the conditions of existence are themselves symbolic constructions within the same framework. Drawing on experimental findings from neuroscience and theoretical frameworks including Dennett's user-illusion, Metzinger's phenomenal self-model, Friston's predictive processing, and Hoffman's interface theory, the paper demonstrates that the dreamer is inside the dream, not outside it. The implications of this recognition are explored across multiple domains, including collective consciousness, identity formation, and the nature of suffering. The paper concludes that recognizing the holographic nature of experience does not eliminate the appearance of reality but transforms one's relationship to it, enabling a lighter, more compassionate engagement with the dream without a dreamer.