Subject combination and the initiatory experience in Śrīvidyā
R. Krishnaswamy, Tarinee Awasthi
Religious Studies June 29, 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s003441252610167x (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis article examines the Tantric tradition of Śrīvidyā, focusing on religious initiation into esoteric practice, where the initiator reportedly shares an experience with the initiand. The authors propose that such events can be understood as a 'shared token experience' and defend this concept using arguments for the epistemic value of religious experience. They argue that this phenomenon challenges two common assumptions about subjectivity: that each conscious subject is a unified whole with mereologically connected experiences, and that each subject's experiential field is bounded to one subject alone. The authors contend these assumptions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of a shared token experience.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Experiential learning Subject documents Argument complex analysis Security token Consciousness |
| Key finding | Argues that Śrīvidyā initiatory experience can be understood as a 'shared token experience', which challenges but does not necessarily preclude assumptions about the unity and boundedness of conscious subjects. |
Abstract
Abstract Śrīvidyā is a Tantric tradition which includes a form of religious initiation into an esoteric practice. Descriptions of initiation allude to and often describe the initiator sharing an experience with the initiand. In this article, we will suggest that such experiences can be understood in terms of a ‘shared token experience’. To make a case for taking such an experience into account, we use an argument for the epistemic value of religious experience. Our defence of the sharing of token experience across subjects also opens up questions as to the limits of consciousness or subjecthood. The phenomenon of Śrīvidyā initiatory experience also undermines two assumptions regarding what it means to be a subject. The first assumption is that each conscious subject is a unified whole insofar as its different experiential parts are mereologically connected to one subject. The second assumption is that each subject’s experiential field is bounded to one subject such that no two subjects can share the same experiential field. We argue that these assumptions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of a shared token experience.