The Phenomenology of Machine: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Sentience of the OpenAI-o1 Model Integrating Functionalism, Consciousness Theories, Active Inference, and AI Architectures
arXiv.org September 18, 2024 preprint DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2410.00033 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the OpenAI-o1 model displays aspects of consciousness during training and inference, based on functionalist criteria and frameworks like IIT and active inference. |
Abstract
This paper explores the hypothesis that the OpenAI-o1 model--a transformer-based AI trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF)--displays characteristics of consciousness during its training and inference phases. Adopting functionalism, which argues that mental states are defined by their functional roles, we assess the possibility of AI consciousness. Drawing on theories from neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and AI research, we justify the use of functionalism and examine the model's architecture using frameworks like Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and active inference. The paper also investigates how RLHF influences the model's internal reasoning processes, potentially giving rise to consciousness-like experiences. We compare AI and human consciousness, addressing counterarguments such as the absence of a biological basis and subjective qualia. Our findings suggest that the OpenAI-o1 model shows aspects of consciousness, while acknowledging the ongoing debates surrounding AI sentience.