Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images by stafford, barbara maria
Shannon Foskett
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism May 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6245.2011.01465_9.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Echo communications protocol Cognition Work physics Cartography Art history |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that image-making is a fundamental form of cognitive work and that theories of mind must account for images across history, not merely illustrate with famous artworks. Proposes criteria for such theories while drawing on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. |
Abstract
Stafford, Barbara Maria. Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images. University of Chicago Press, 2007, xiii + 281 pp., 14 color illus. + 93 b&w illus., $45.00 cloth, $30.00 paper. Echo Objects is a visionary, masterful project that delivers on the promise of robust interdisciplinary work. Motivated by recent findings and speculations in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, Barbara Stafford, an art historian, takes on the daunting task of laying the foundational synthesis for deeper, investigative research into problems shared by all disciplines that take the mind, brain, and images as objects of study. The result is that this book makes a substantial and pioneering contribution to the philosophy of art, where art is broadly understood by the author as any “deliberate design or spatiotemporal pattern making” (p. 202). Stafford's foray into the ontology of images moves through the nature of perception and many of the most pernicious questions plaguing consciousness studies today (the hard problem, the binding problem). By the end, she offers criteria that a theory of mind must meet if it is to take account of image making as such, in the full range of its historical manifestations, and not merely cherry‐pick from examples of well‐known art for the sake of mere illustration. Stafford succeeds in her stated aims of opening up a particular conversation and marshals more than enough evidence to make a case for it. But some readers might find the exposition of the argument too brisk and responses to possible objections left wanting. Some philosophers of mind might take issue with the particular epiphenomenalist, connectionist, and dynamical systems models of mind that her claims presuppose.