The Standpoint of the Perceiver

The human standpoint is distinguished from that of non-rational animals, and contrasts with the God's eye viewpoint of traditional metaphysics. The author draws distinctions between lower and higher representations of objects based on cognitive involvement. Space and time are presented as human forms of intuition rather than Newton's absolute sensoria, leading to Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves. However, the author defends a deflated version of Kant's transcendental idealism, advocating for a special variety of direct realism in philosophy of perception. Even within empirical realism, space can be seen as a form of perceiving, as perceptual content is organized spatially and mirrors a perceived scene.

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Abstract

The human standpoint and what sets it apart from the standpoint of non-rational animals is discussed. Some distinctions are also drawn between “lower” and “higher" representations of objects in terms of how much they involve of the cognitive apparatus. Additionally, it is discussed briefly how the human standpoint contrasts with the God’s eye viewpoint of traditional metaphysics. This brings us to a distinctive framework for empirical cognition of objects, namely, space and time as human forms of intuition – rather than God’s absolute “sensoria,” as in Isaac Newton. The framework gives rise to the distinction between appearances and things in themselves that comes with Kant’s Copernican turn. However, what is to be defended in subsequent chapters is a special variety of direct realism in philosophy of perception, and, thus, a deflated version of the “transcendental” side of Kant’s position. Even within mere empirical realism, with transcendental idealism bracketed, space can be seen as a form of perceiving, in so far as perceptual content is organized in a space-like manner and mirrors the layout of a spatial, perceived scene.