Better be a Zombie?
May 29, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198994121.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Keywords | Pessimism Perspective graphical Value mathematics Epistemology Happiness |
| Key points | Argues that early Buddhism holds phenomenal consciousness to have intrinsic disvalue, and that existing as a philosophical zombie is preferable to attaining nibbāna. |
Abstract
Abstract According to many philosophers, something possesses intrinsic value if it is good in and of itself, without any external justifications. In contemporary scholarship, notable thinkers like Thomas Nagel (1979), William Frankena (1973), Charles Siewert (1998), and Walter Glannon (2016) argue that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective aspect or “what it’s likeness” of experience—holds positive intrinsic value. It is uncommon to encounter a pessimistic perspective on the intrinsic value of phenomenal consciousness. The chapter proposes that early Buddhism espouses the belief in the intrinsic disvalue of phenomenal consciousness. By examining the Four Nikāyas (a group of early Buddhist foundational texts), the chapter contends that early Buddhism would even endorse the notion that it is preferable to exist as a philosophical zombie—a being physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from a human but lacking consciousness—rather than attaining nibbāna, the ultimate goal of liberation.