Better be a Zombie?

Early Buddhism, as presented in the Four Nikāyas, argues that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, experiential aspect of awareness—has intrinsic disvalue rather than positive intrinsic value. The chapter contends that early Buddhist texts would even endorse the notion that it is preferable to exist as a philosophical zombie (a being physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from a human but lacking consciousness) rather than attaining nibbāna, the ultimate goal of liberation. This pessimistic perspective challenges contemporary philosophers who argue that phenomenal consciousness holds positive intrinsic value.

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Abstract

Abstract According to many philosophers, something possesses intrinsic value if it is good in and of itself, without any external justifications. In contemporary scholarship, notable thinkers like Thomas Nagel (1979), William Frankena (1973), Charles Siewert (1998), and Walter Glannon (2016) argue that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective aspect or “what it’s likeness” of experience—holds positive intrinsic value. It is uncommon to encounter a pessimistic perspective on the intrinsic value of phenomenal consciousness. The chapter proposes that early Buddhism espouses the belief in the intrinsic disvalue of phenomenal consciousness. By examining the Four Nikāyas (a group of early Buddhist foundational texts), the chapter contends that early Buddhism would even endorse the notion that it is preferable to exist as a philosophical zombie—a being physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from a human but lacking consciousness—rather than attaining nibbāna, the ultimate goal of liberation.