Philosophy matters in brain matters.
Siri Hustvedt
Seizure April 1, 2013 DOI: 10.1016/j.seizure.2013.01.002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the language of 'psychogenic' diagnoses reflects an unexamined Cartesian dualism and implicit bias, and that narrative framing can enhance patient agency regardless of symptom relief. |
Abstract
Although most neuroscientists and physicians would argue against Cartesian dualism, Descartes's version of the psyche/soma divide, which has been controversial since he proposed it in the seventeenth century, continues to haunt contemporary neurological diagnoses through terms such as functional, organic, and psychogenic. Drawing on my own experiences as a person with medically unexplained seizures, I ask what this language actually means if all human experience has an organic basis. Close reading of a textbook chapter on psychogenic seizures. I expose the author's unreflective embrace of psyche and soma as distinct entities, his inherent bias against illnesses labeled psychogenic, and the implicit sexism of his position. I further argue that even when a patient's symptoms are not alleviated, heightened self-consciousness and narrative framing can strengthen his or her sense of agency and have therapeutic benefits. The ethical treatment of patients requires a respect for their stories.