Brentano and the Ideality of Time
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea August 31, 2021 DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42918 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychoanalysis |
| Key points | Argues that Brentano's version of the ideality of time view, which claims temporal succession is unreal, can be understood as broadly Humean despite significant differences. |
Abstract
How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.