Brentano and the Ideality of Time
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea August 31, 2021 DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42918 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper examines how present memory experiences of past events are possible, addressing the philosophical puzzle that past events are no longer directly experienced. It outlines Brentano's version of the 'ideality of time view,' which holds that temporal succession is unreal, and contrasts it with Hume's version. The author suggests that, despite significant differences, Brentano's view can be construed as broadly Humean.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy Psychology Psychoanalysis |
| Key finding | Argues that Brentano's version of the ideality of time view, which claims temporal succession is unreal, can be understood as broadly Humean despite significant differences. |
Abstract
How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.