Is remembering constructive imagining?
Synthese October 26, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04338-5 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper argues that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining, because the constructive processes in each are constrained and controlled differently at the level of consciousness. Specifically, it contends that remembering and imagining differ in the kinds of interventions one can make on these processes as they unfold. If correct, this vindicates a form of discontinuism: remembering and imagining are processes of different kinds.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Constructive Philosophy of language Philosophy of science Consciousness Epistemology |
| Citations | 24 |
| Key finding | Argues that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because the two processes differ in how their constructive processes are consciously constrained and controlled, thereby supporting a form of discontinuism. |
Abstract
Abstract The (dis)continuism debate —the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining . In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained , and hence controlled , in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds.