Is remembering constructive imagining?
Synthese October 26, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04338-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Constructive Philosophy of language Philosophy of science Consciousness Epistemology Metaphysics Cognitive science Process computing |
| Citations | 24 |
| Key points | Argues that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because the two processes differ in how their constructive processes are consciously constrained and controlled, thereby supporting a form of discontinuism. |
Abstract
Abstract The (dis)continuism debate —the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining . In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained , and hence controlled , in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds.