Subjective Conceptions
Metaphor and Moral Experience July 20, 2000 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that genuine moral judgments require moral competence, which depends on the ability to conceive of others' purposes from their subjective point of view, involving affective and motivational phenomenology. |
Abstract
AbstractGenuine moral judgements might be only available to someone possessed of moral competence, and moral competence requires, at a minimum, that one be susceptible to a specific kind of moral experience — the experience of others' concerns and interests as valuable. That experience, in turn, requires that one be able to conceive of others' purposes as from their subjective point of view, a conception which features some of the affective and motivational phenomenology which they themselves enjoy. This chapter examines subjectivity and its relationship to idiosyncracy, how imagination contributes to one's ability to conceive adequately of others' perspectival experiences including their sentiments, and how the subjective imagination contributes to one's other-person ascriptions of experience.