Indirect Phenomenology: Prereflective Self-Awareness and Intersubjective Interaction
The MIT Press eBooks December 16, 2025 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/14600.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Perspective graphical Feature linguistics Identification biology Field mathematics |
| Key points | Argues that consciousness in relation to social interaction requires considering extensive and enactive processes of bodily engagement, and that prereflective self-awareness is a basic structural feature of consciousness. |
Abstract
In this chapter I argue that to understand consciousness in relation to social interaction, we need to consider not just brain mechanisms, but also the extensive and enactive pro cesses of bodily engagement in the social environment.In addition, I suggest that the starting point for such an analy sis should not be reflective self-consciousness (see glossary), as if that were simply equivalent to consciousness.Rather, I'll argue for the importance of prereflective self-awareness (see glossary) as a basic structural feature of consciousness.I provide some of the academic background on how I arrived at these arguments.