Indirect Phenomenology: Prereflective Self-Awareness and Intersubjective Interaction

Consciousness cannot be understood solely through brain mechanisms; bodily engagement in the social environment is equally important. The author argues that the starting point for analysis should be prereflective self-awareness, not reflective self-consciousness, as a basic structural feature of consciousness. The chapter provides academic background on how the author arrived at these arguments.

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Abstract

In this chapter I argue that to understand consciousness in relation to social interaction, we need to consider not just brain mechanisms, but also the extensive and enactive pro cesses of bodily engagement in the social environment.In addition, I suggest that the starting point for such an analy sis should not be reflective self-consciousness (see glossary), as if that were simply equivalent to consciousness.Rather, I'll argue for the importance of prereflective self-awareness (see glossary) as a basic structural feature of consciousness.I provide some of the academic background on how I arrived at these arguments.