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Santayana’s Philosophy of Mind

Patrick Shade, John Lachs

Freedom and Limits March 3, 2014 DOI: 10.5422/fordham/9780823256747.003.0004 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Santayana's use of the Aristotelian distinction between process and activity provides a coherent defense of epiphenomenalism, preserving mind-body duality without introducing nonphysical forces into scientific investigation.

Abstract

In this defense of epiphenomenalism, Lachs highlights Santayana's use of the Aristotelian distinction between process and activity to argue that mental life is an impotent byproduct of the body. Processes involve movement from potentiality to actuality and so are temporally differentiated. Activity by contrast is complete and self-contained, lacking heterogeneous parts or any essential temporal reference. Consciousness (or spirit, to use Santayana's terminology) is the actualization of physiological processes, possessing the perfections of pure activity. Being fully actualized, it lacks the power to bring anything into existence. Lachs argues that this position preserves our experience of the duality of mind and body while also leaving the world open to scientific investigation, unimpaired by mental or nonphysical forces.

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