Taking Conceptual Issues Really Seriously: One Next Step for the Cognitive Science of Consciousness
Tony Cheng, Yi Lin, Philip Tseng
Cognitive Science November 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13213 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe letter argues that cognitive science of consciousness, despite recent progress, tends to downplay conceptual issues and underestimate the difficulties of various problems. This tendency, illustrated with a few prominent examples, may be problematic for the field's future progress.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that downplaying conceptual issues in consciousness research may impede progress in cognitive science. |
Abstract
AbstractIn this letter we focus on the cognitive science of consciousness. The general message is that, while this interdisciplinary area has made much progress in recent years, there is a tendency of downplaying conceptual issues, and therefore underestimating the difficulties of various problems. We briefly focus on a few prominent examples only, due to the space limit, but the general message should be clear: this recent tendency can be problematic for the progress of the consciousness branch of cognitive sciences.