The Concept of Mind in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy and Its Relevance to Modern Cognitive Science

Abstract

Abstract: The philosophical tradition has been preoccupied with the concept of the mind throughout various intellectual traditions. Indian philosophy gives us a great insight of mind and its workings. The classical schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika give a distinctive account of mind (manas) as an internal organ mediating between the self, the senses and external objects. Unlike materialistic theories that identify consciousness with bodily processes, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika posits the mind as a subtle and independent substance needed for cognition, perception, memory, desire, pleasure, pain and other mental states. The system makes a clear distinction between mind and self. It is said that consciousness arises only when self, mind, sense organs and objects are appropriately linked. In this paper I consider the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mind within the general context of Indian philosophical thought. It is concerned with the ontological status of mind, its role as an internal sense organ and its role in the process of acquisition of knowledge. The study also explores the Naiyāyikas’ theory of attention, perception and cognition and how it provides a systematic account of mental activity. Special emphasis is placed on the philosophical arguments that are used to establish the existence of the mind and explain the relationship between subjective experience and cognitive awareness. The paper integrates Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insights with current psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind discussions to demonstrate their relevance today. But even given its intellectual and historical context, its observations about attention, inner perception, and the mediation of experience are relevant to current debates.