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The Concept of Mind in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy and Its Relevance to Modern Cognitive Science

Babita Sarkar

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 15, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21389633 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy posits the mind (manas) as a subtle, independent substance that mediates between the self, sense organs, and external objects, rather than identifying consciousness with bodily processes. Consciousness arises only when self, mind, sense organs, and objects are appropriately linked. The system distinguishes mind from self and treats mind as an internal organ necessary for cognition, perception, memory, desire, pleasure, pain, and other mental states. The paper examines the ontological status of mind, its role as an internal sense organ, and its function in knowledge acquisition, including the Naiyāyikas' theory of attention, perception, and cognition. It integrates these insights with current psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind, arguing that observations about attention, inner perception, and the mediation of experience remain relevant to contemporary debates.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Consciousness Mental representation Relevance law Materialism
Key finding Argues that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mind as an independent internal organ offers insights relevant to current debates in psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

Abstract

Abstract: The philosophical tradition has been preoccupied with the concept of the mind throughout various intellectual traditions. Indian philosophy gives us a great insight of mind and its workings. The classical schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika give a distinctive account of mind (manas) as an internal organ mediating between the self, the senses and external objects. Unlike materialistic theories that identify consciousness with bodily processes, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika posits the mind as a subtle and independent substance needed for cognition, perception, memory, desire, pleasure, pain and other mental states. The system makes a clear distinction between mind and self. It is said that consciousness arises only when self, mind, sense organs and objects are appropriately linked. In this paper I consider the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mind within the general context of Indian philosophical thought. It is concerned with the ontological status of mind, its role as an internal sense organ and its role in the process of acquisition of knowledge. The study also explores the Naiyāyikas’ theory of attention, perception and cognition and how it provides a systematic account of mental activity. Special emphasis is placed on the philosophical arguments that are used to establish the existence of the mind and explain the relationship between subjective experience and cognitive awareness. The paper integrates Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insights with current psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind discussions to demonstrate their relevance today. But even given its intellectual and historical context, its observations about attention, inner perception, and the mediation of experience are relevant to current debates.

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