Non-analogical panpsychism: AI may be phenomenologically conscious

Abstract

Panpsychism posits that mental properties are fundamental, potentially extending consciousness to AI. Arvan and Maley (2022) recently challenged this notion, asserting that AI, being digital, cannot achieve coherent phenomenal macroconsciousness due to the fact that digital representations miss information between the representation and the representee. Their reasoning hinges on the analog/non-analog distinction, the definition of coherent phenomenal consciousness, and the alleged inability of non-analog systems to achieve coherence. This paper examines their argument and emphasizes the importance of the user in both determining the analog/non-analog distinction, previously discussed by Katz (2016), and understanding the ‘coherence aspect’. This work proposes a thought experiment where a user with higher perceptual resolution may perceive Homo sapiens as non-analog. However, it asserts that humans still experience analog representations, irrespective of subjective interpretations. The subjectivity and multidimensional nature of phenomenal consciousness challenge the coherence argument, suggesting that users subjectively construct coherent experiences. Thus, the analog/non-analog interpretation of AI may not conclusively determine their potential for consciousness, leaving the possibility open for future AI consciousness.