Thought Experiments as a Tool for Undermining Methodological Naturalism

The author argues that methodological naturalism—the principle that science should only invoke natural explanations—should not be a universal rule in science. By reviewing thought experiments, the author shows how metaphysical naturalism (the belief that only natural things exist) could be empirically falsified. This undermines the case for always requiring naturalistic explanations. The author then discusses recent experimental research on near-death experiences that may soon provide such empirical evidence against metaphysical naturalism.

Study at a glance

Abstract

There is a substantial literature on the question of whether methodological naturalism (MN) is and/or should be among the principles operative in the natural and social sciences; moreover the status of MN has been one of the battle grounds in prominent debates regarding the demarcation lines between science and theology (e.g., the debate over whether intelligent design hypotheses can ever count as genuinely scientific). I review some concrete examples of the use of thought experiments in this context, and argue that there are realistic thought experiments showing how metaphysical naturalism (MTN) could be subjected to empirical falsification; that in turn implies that MN should not be employed universally as an operative principle in the sciences. I conclude by discussing some recent actual experimental work concerning near-death experiences (NDEs), work which may point towards the likelihood of just such empirical falsification taking place in the relatively near future.