Vatted dreams: neurophilosophy and the politics of phenomenal internalism

Anthropologists often criticize neurophilosophers for reducing mind to brain, yet they cite philosophers who view mind as emerging from brain, body, and environment. This article examines 'phenomenal internalists'—neurophilosophers who believe consciousness can supervene on the brain alone. Their ontological commitment is driven by existential and political experiences, from false awakenings to disenchantment with 1970s counterculture, and draws from neuroscientific research on the dreaming brain. The article concludes with a plea for anthropologists to attend to relations of detachment, both social and neural, and to reconsider their own ontological commitment to externalism in light of dream research.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Despite much social‐scientific work on the neurosciences, little ethnographic and historical attention has been paid to the field of neurophilosophy. Yet anthropologists studying brain research occasionally critique neurophilosophers for reducing the mind to the brain while affirmatively citing philosophers of mind who present the mind as emerging from interactions between brain, body, and environment. This article examines the ostracized camp of so‐called ‘phenomenal internalists’ – neurophilosophers who believe that consciousness can supervene on the brain alone. This ontological commitment is driven by certain existential and political experiences from false awakenings to disenchantment with the counterculture of the 1970s. But it also draws from neuroscientific research on the dreaming brain. The inquiry concludes with a plea to anthropologists to attend to relations of detachment, both social and neural, and to reconsider their own ontological commitment to externalism in the light of dream research.