The Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems
Adam B. Barrett, Pedro A. M. Mediano
arXiv Preprint Archive February 12, 2019 preprint
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc Consciousness theory Awareness Sentience Mind Cognition Quantitative biology Computational neuroscience Biological physics Neurocomputation Consciousness measurement Quantifying consciousness Phi Consciousness metric Measurable consciousness Consciousness quantification Theoretical analysis Mathematical foundations Theory refinement Foundational issues Mathematical rigor Conceptual analysis Theoretical critique Mathematical definition |
| Key points | Argues that the current formulation of Phi in Integrated Information Theory is ill-defined or ambiguous in at least three ways, undermining its plausibility. |
Abstract
According to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, consciousness is a fundamental observer-independent property of physical systems, and the measure Phi of integrated information is identical to the quantity or level of consciousness. For this to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Phi consistent with the axioms of IIT, and there should not be cases of Phi being ill-defined. This article presents three ways in which Phi, in its current formulation, fails to meet these standards, and discusses how this problem might be addressed.