Skip to content

Alefela Predictive Consciousness Theory: Personality and Social Cognition (Part II)

Maxim Romanov

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 26, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20922824 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Sample size 1
Population The author (systematic phenomenological self-observation)
Duration 2012–2025
Keywords Mechanism biology Personality Subject documents Perspective graphical Social cognition Dialogical self Ontology Premise Cognitive psychology Epistemology Cognitive science Inference Similarity geometry Object grammar Psyche
Key points Proposes that the 'Self' is a functional position in imaginal space sequentially occupied by different subjects, with identification and disidentification explaining phenomena such as empathy, self-sacrifice, and Stockholm Syndrome.

Abstract

Part II extends the basic Observation–Forecast–Motivator–Reaction cycle (Part I) to the phenomena of personality and social cognition, specifying the ontology of the “Self” as a functional position in imaginal space. Existing theories of multiple "Selves" (Internal Family Systems, Dialogical Self Theory) and Theory of Mind (Goldman, 2006) do not provide an explicit ontological specification of the "Self": IFS conceptualizes the psyche in terms of internal "parts," Goldman presupposes a persistent self and requires a quarantine mechanism to prevent interference between pretend and actual beliefs. Metzinger (2003) defines the "Self" as a phenomenal model (an illusion), but does not propose a mechanism for the multiplicity of agent positions. Alefela postulates that the “Self” is a functional position (office) in imaginal space, sequentially occupied by different subjects — spatially localized mental models of oneself or others. A shift of subject means that observation and forecasting begin to be carried out from that subject’s perspective. The “Self” is not a substrate; parallel agent positions are not assumed. Personality = the subject “Self” in context. Intrapersonal conflict is a state of being stuck in choosing the subject “Self” (personality) from whose perspective forecasting is carried out. Informational asymmetry (epistemic inaccessibility of another’s internal states) makes projection a necessary mechanism of Theory of Mind: models of others are constructed through structural similarity with one’s own experience. Consequence: the “Self” and projections of others are ontologically identical (a shared experiential repository). Projections possess hyper-knowledgeability — the goals and forecasts of a projection are formed with regard to the goals and forecasts of others (including the subject “Self”), implicitly providing access to others’ internal states. Consequence: the emergence of a false experience that others are aware of the individual’s hidden flaws or secrets. Identification — reassignment of the “Self” (the functional position) to another subject “Self” (personality) or to a projection of another person, with a complete switching of the forecasting system to that subject (rather than Goldman’s quarantine mechanism). It explains self-sacrifice (threat to a child → identification with the child → the child’s forecasts dominate over one’s own), empathy, and Stockholm Syndrome. Identification is accompanied by disidentification from the previous subject “Self.” Alienation is a subtype of disidentification in which the current subject “Self” comes to be perceived as an outsider. Anthropomorphization. Inanimate items and phenomena that are structurally similar to human behavior are modeled as subjects in imaginal space through the mechanism of projection. Alienation of subjects “Self” and anthropomorphization of the environment create invisible entities—subjects without a visual form, endowed with will and goals (spirits, demons). This provides a basis for paranoia and mystical experience. The theory generates four falsifiable predictions: (1) discrete changes in emotion following identification with another, (2) instantaneous cascade resolution of intrapersonal conflicts by making conscious the forecasts of the subject "Self" at the beginning of a chain reaction, (3) reduction of symptom intensity through identification with an anthropomorphized projection of the symptom, and (4) automatic identification with a structurally similar participant in an observed conflict. These predictions distinguish Alefela from IFS and simulation-based theories of Theory of Mind. The theory is grounded in systematic phenomenological self-observation (2012–2025, n = 1). Independent empirical validation is required. Keywords: predictive consciousness, multiplicity of self, functional position, internal conflicts, projection, Theory of Mind, identification, disidentification, predictive processing Part I of the series introduces the Observation–Forecast–Motivator–Reaction (OFMR) framework. The present manuscript extends this framework to personality and social cognition.