Interaction Model of Brain and Consciousness

The chapter presents an interaction model of brain activity to characterize neural correlates of consciousness. Empirical evidence from disorders of consciousness, anesthesia, and sleep shows that the degree of non-additive interaction between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity indexes the level of consciousness in a fine-grained way, making it a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In contrast, spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are a necessary condition for possible consciousness, termed a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC). Drawing on Nancy Cartwright's concept of capacities, the author argues that the brain's non-additive interaction underlying consciousness depends on the spontaneous activity's capacity, which is traceable to its spatiotemporal features—a "spatiotemporal capacity." The data suggest a capacity-based rather than law-based approach to understanding the brain-consciousness relationship.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In addition to the spectrum model, I also introduced an interaction model to characterize the brain’s neural activity (chapter 2). Is the interaction model of brain also relevant for consciousness? That is the focus in the present chapter. I here present various lines of empirical evidence focusing on disorders of consciousness like vegetative state, anesthesia, and sleep. Based on empirical evidence, I show that the degree of non-additive interaction between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity indexes the level of consciousness in a seemingly rather fine-grained way; for that reason, it may be considered a neural correlate of the level of consciousness, i.e., NCC. In contrast, the spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure is rather a necessary condition of possible consciousness, that is, a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC). The concept of NPC is further enriched by the concept of capacities for which I recruit Nancy Cartwright. I suggest that the brain’s non-additive interaction including the subsequent association of stimulus-induced activity with consciousness is based on the spontaneous activity’s capacity. Since that very same capacity, operating as NPC, can be traced to the spontaneous activity’s spatiotemporal features, I speak of “spatiotemporal capacity”. I conclude that the empirical data suggest a capacity-based approach (rather than law-based approach) to the brain and how it is related to consciousness.