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Transitional Identity: Becoming, Nothingness, and Event in Heidegger and Ueda

Hoko Nakagawa

Kritike An Online Journal of Philosophy February 1, 2026 DOI: 10.25138/19.4.a5 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Phenomenology philosophy Identity music Experiential learning Interpretation philosophy Event particle physics Identity formation Epistemology Phenomenon Differential mechanical device Absolute philosophy
Key points Argues that identity is a dynamic process constituted through becoming, transition, wandering, and distress, rather than self-preservation or formal self-coincidence.

Abstract

Referring to Martin Heidegger’s thought, this paper argues that identity should be understood not as self-preservation or formal self-coincidence (A = A), but as a dynamic process constituted through becoming, transition, wandering, and distress. Rather than confining identity to Heidegger’s later conceptual-historical discussions, the paper reconstructs it through an experiential structure running across his work—an “inability to fully identify.” Methodologically, the paper reconstructs Heidegger’s account of identity along three interrelated dimensions: the provisional and ongoing identity of becoming Dasein; a differential identity articulated within the difference between entities and Being; and the eventual identity of thinking and Being as mutual belonging (Ereignis). On this basis, the paper examines Shizuteru Ueda’s interpretation of the Ten Ox-Herding Pictures as a phenomenology of self-existence culminating in absolute nothingness. Through a comparative analysis centered on becoming, nothingness/bottomlessness, and event, the paper clarifies both affinities and differences between Heidegger’s and Ueda’s accounts, proposing a framework for rethinking identity beyond self coincidence and for advancing East–West dialogue.