Forgetting in Dōgen

Abstract

This paper examines the philosophical and ethical significance of “forgetting” in Dōgen’s thought. It argues that the deepest form of forgetting—“forgetting oneself”—is not a psychological loss but a transformative practice through which a self-centered mode of existence is relinquished, allowing access to a multi-dimensional world in which beings appear across different ontological and normative domains. The paper first distinguishes three modes of forgetting articulated in Dōgen’s writings, focusing on forgetting oneself as the pivotal moment that discloses the structure of such domains. It then clarifies this mode through a close reading of Genjōkōan, showing that Dōgen’s account neither collapses into monism nor into nihilistic negation, but instead articulates a mode of existence in which the self is verified by the myriad dharmas. Building on this analysis, the paper situates forgetting within an ethical context. While human life is shaped by particular moral norms, Dōgen’s thought reveals that each body-and-mind simultaneously participates in multiple physical, biological, and value-structured domains. Ethical responsiveness, on this view, does not arise from the application of fixed moral principles but from the capacity to perceive and respond to such plural domains through the practice of forgetting oneself. A comparative discussion with Zhuangzi and Nietzsche further clarifies this point by contrast, highlighting the distinctive ethical reach of Dōgen’s conception of forgetting.