What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness?
Gerard O'Brien, Jonathan P. Opie
Behavioral and Brain Sciences October 1, 1999 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x99482184 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Dienes and Perner's theory of explicit and implicit knowledge relies on the Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness, reducing its plausibility and usefulness, and that consensus on the distinction is still far off. |
Abstract
Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.