What Is It Like to Be a Brain Simulation?
arXiv Preprint Archive February 1, 2014 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA brain simulation would likely have a different kind of subjective experience than a biological brain, according to this theoretical analysis. The paper evaluates how experience might differ under several hypotheses about consciousness and simulation properties, including general physicalist and panexperientialist perspectives. It examines the brain prosthesis thought experiment and identifies finer questions about whether a simulated brain could have experiences at all, and if so, how they would compare to biological experience. The authors argue that the differences depend on which metaphysical assumptions one adopts, with panexperientialism suggesting simulation could have a richer experiential character than physicalism allows.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cs.ai |
| Key finding | Argues that whether a brain simulation would have subjective experience depends on the metaphysical framework adopted, with physicalist and panexperientialist perspectives yielding different answers. |
Abstract
We frame the question of what kind of subjective experience a brain simulation would have in contrast to a biological brain. We discuss the brain prosthesis thought experiment. We evaluate how the experience of the brain simulation might differ from the biological, according to a number of hypotheses about experience and the properties of simulation. Then, we identify finer questions relating to the original inquiry, and answer them from both a general physicalist, and panexperientialist perspective.