How Far we Can Go Without Looking Under the Skin: The Bounds of Cognitive Science
Afeltowicz Łukasz, Wachowski Witold
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric August 26, 2015 DOI: 10.1515/slgr-2015-0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive science Distributed cognition Externalism Internalism Representations |
| Key points | Argues that distributed cognition provides a distinct framework from the extended mind for understanding how cognitive processes extend beyond the individual to include external representations and social structures. |
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.