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Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience.

Megan A. K. Peters

Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews November 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104903 (opens in new tab) via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Perceptual metacognition—the ability to reflect on one's own perceptual experiences, such as feeling confident about a decision—offers a promising entry point for studying the neural and computational basis of subjective conscious experience. This review identifies five unique properties of metacognition that make it empirically tractable: it produces subjective feelings, is directed at internal representations, involves recursive computations, is linked to observable behavior, and requires sensitive models because its computations are unobservable yet hierarchically dependent. Computational models of metacognition can help characterize the generative processes that construct qualitative experience, drawing on advances in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Review Qualitative Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Computational modeling Consciousness Metacognition Qualia
Key finding Perceptual metacognition has five properties that make it a powerful opportunity for studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience.

Abstract

Science and philosophy have long struggled with how to even begin studying the neural or computational basis of qualitative experience. Here I review psychological, neuroscience, and philosophical literature to reveal how perceptual metacognition possesses five unique properties that provide a powerful opportunity for studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience: (1) Metacognition leads to subjective experiences (we "feel" confident); (2) Metacognition is "about" internal representations, formalizing introspection; (3) Metacognitive computations are "recursive" (applying to meta-cognition and meta-meta-cognition), so we might discover "canonical computations" preserved across processing levels and implementations; (4) Metacognition is anchored to observable behavior; and (5) Metacognitive computations are unobservable yet hierarchically dependent, requiring development of sensitive, specific models. Given these properties, computational models of metacognition provide an empirically-tractable early step in characterizing the generative process that constructs qualitative experience. I also present practical ways to make progress in this vein, applying decades of developments in nearby fields to perceptual metacognition to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs subjective conscious experiences.

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