Modelling the simultaneous encoding/serial experience theory of the perceptual moment: a blink of meta-experience.

When people see two stimuli in rapid succession, the second one is often missed—a phenomenon called the attentional blink. But a new dissociation has been found: while the brain can encode both stimuli into working memory, people consciously experience only the first. This gap between objective encoding and subjective experience, called the meta-experiential blink, grows larger under greater perceptual overload. The findings suggest that the ability to reflect on one's own visual experience (meta-experience) can decouple from what is actually encoded. Computational modeling using the reSTST model, which simulates parallel encoding but serial conscious experience, fits both behavioral and EEG data. This work challenges theories of consciousness, including global workspace theory and higher-order theories, by showing that conscious experience may be inherently serial even when encoding is parallel.

Study at a glance

Abstract

One way to understand a system is to explore how its behaviour degrades when it is overloaded. This approach can be applied to understanding conscious perception by presenting stimuli in rapid succession in the 'same' perceptual event/moment. In previous work, we have identified a striking dissociation during the perceptual moment, between what is encoded into working memory [Lag-1 sparing in the attentional blink (AB)] and what is consciously perceived (Lag-1 impairing in the experiential blink). This paper links this dissociation to what, taking inspiration from the metacognition literature, could be called meta-experience; i.e. how the ability to track and comment on one's visual experience with subjectivity ratings reflects objective performance. Specifically, we provide evidence that the information (in bits) associated with an encoding into working memory decouples from the experiential reflection upon that perceptual/encoding event and that this decoupling is largest when there is the greatest perceptual overload. This is the meta-experiential blink. Meta-experiential self-observation is common to many computational models, including connectionist interpretations of consciousness, Bayesian observers and the readout-enhanced simultaneous type/serial token (reSTST) model. We assess how our meta-experiential blink data could be modelled using the concept of self-observation, providing model fits to behavioural and electroencephalogram responses in the reSTST model. We discuss the implications of our computational modelling of parallel encoding but serial experience for theories of conscious perception. Specifically, we (i) inform theories of Lag-1 sparing during the AB and (ii) consider the implications for the global workspace theory of conscious perception and higher-order theories of consciousness.