What I Am and What I Am Not: Destruktion of the Mind–Body Problem
Philosophies December 22, 2023 DOI: 10.3390/philosophies8060110 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Mind–body problem Consciousness Destruktion Heidegger Descartes |
| Key points | Argues that the mind–body problem inherits concealed assumptions from Descartes' dualism, which can be dissolved by applying Heidegger's concept of 'destruction' to reveal a new framework for consciousness research. |
Abstract
The German word destruktion is used here in the sense that philosophy should destroy some ontological concepts and the everyday meanings of certain words. Tradition allows the transmission of knowledge, but it can perpetuate certain prejudices. According to Heidegger, tradition transmits, but it also conceals. Tradition induces self-evidence and prevents us from accessing the origin of concepts. It makes us believe that we do not need to return to that origin. Making tradition transparent dissolves the concealments it has provoked. Here, I apply this idea to the mind–body problem, which has inherited occultations that are born from Descartes himself. As a result, a new philosophical framework for research on consciousness emerges: that, as an individual cognitive being, I cannot avoid splitting reality into what I am and what I am not, extending then the individual duality to a collective error transmitted culturally.
Comparable studies
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| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 5
- Precis of Consciousness Explained Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0 PLoS Comput. Biol. May 1, 2014
- Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness Canadian Journal of Philosophy December 1, 2006
- Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience. Progress in Brain Research 2005
- Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology February 1, 1956